No. 94,273
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS
DEREK H. BRENNAN and CATHERINE M. BRENNAN,
Husband and Wife,
Appellees/Cross-appellants,
v.
CHRISTIAN W. KUNZLE and JANET L. KUNZLE, et al.,
Appellants/Cross-appellees.
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT
1. The existence of fraud is normally a question of fact. Therefore, an appellate court's standard of review is limited to determining whether the trial court's findings of fact are supported by substantial competent evidence and whether the findings are sufficient to support the trial court's conclusions of law.
2. A court should be cautious in granting a motion for summary judgment when resolution of the dispositive issue necessitates a determination of the state of mind of one or both of the parties.
3. Although fraud must be proved by clear and convincing evidence, a party resisting a motion for summary judgment in an action for fraud need not present clear and convincing evidence of fraud to oppose the motion.
4. To establish fraud by silence against a seller, a buyer must show by clear and convincing evidence the following elements: (1) the seller had knowledge of material facts which the buyer did not have and which the buyer could not have discovered by the exercise of reasonable diligence; (2) the seller was under an obligation to communicate the material facts to the buyer; (3) the seller intentionally failed to communicate the material facts to the buyer; (4) the buyer justifiably relied on the seller to communicate the material facts; and (5) the buyer sustained damages as a result of the seller's failure to communicate the material facts to the buyer.
5. Fraudulent nondisclosure, or fraud by silence, depends in large part on the buyer's inability to discover a defect with a reasonable inspection. A seller can incur a responsibility to disclose material facts when the seller has knowledge of a defect in the property which is not within the fair and reasonable reach of the buyer and which the buyer could not discover through the exercise of reasonable diligence.
6. A matter is material if it is one to which a reasonable person would attach importance in determining his or her choice of action in the transaction in question.
7. In determining whether to purchase a home, a reasonable person would attach importance to a professional report that alerted to further investigation of a home to discover the source of water leaks.
8. Where one party to a contract or transaction has superior knowledge or knowledge that is not within the fair and reasonable reach of the other party and that party could not discover by the exercise of reasonable diligence, or means of knowledge not open to both parties alike, the party is under a legal obligation to speak, and his or her silence constitutes fraud.
9. Under the facts of this case, where the buyers of a home had professional inspections performed before closing on the house but the inspections failed to disclose latent defects in the house, the reasonableness of the buyers' inspections was a question of fact that could not be decided on a motion for summary judgment.
10. In order to prove fraudulent misrepresentation, the buyer of a house must show that there was an untrue statement of fact, known to be untrue by the party making it, made with the intent to deceive or with reckless disregard for the truth, upon which the buyer relies and acts to his or her detriment.
11. The major difference between the torts of fraudulent misrepresentation and negligent misrepresentation is that fraudulent misrepresentation requires proof that the defendant knew the statement was untrue or was reckless as to the truth or falsity of the statement, while negligent misrepresentation requires proof that the defendant failed to exercise reasonable care or competence to obtain or communicate true information.
12. In this case, the language of the buyers' acknowledgment in the disclosure statement directed the buyers to either indicate which representations they were relying on or agree to rely on none of them. The buyers' failure to specifically indicate the representations they were relying on precluded them from maintaining a cause of action based on affirmative or negligent misrepresentations.
13. An "as is" clause in a real estate contract does not shield a seller from liability for fraud.
14. Attorney fees cannot be granted absent statutory authority or an agreement by the parties. A trial court does not have authority to impose attorney fees under its equitable powers absent statutory authority.
15. Under the facts of this case, the promissory note and mortgage document did not allow for recovery of attorney fees incurred by the sellers in defending the buyers' counterclaims.
16. Under the facts of this case, the interest rate to be applied to the unpaid principal balance of the promissory note upon maturity should be determined on the date of maturity and that fixed interest rate should continue until the balance has been paid in full.
Appeal from Johnson District Court; JACK LIVELY, S.J., assigned. Opinion filed March 16, 2007. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with directions.
Michael E. Whitsitt, of Westwood, for appellants/cross-appellees.
Gary A. Schafersman, Eldon Shields, and James L. MowBray, of Wallace, Saunders, Austin, Brown and Enochs, Chartered, of Overland Park, for appellees/cross-appellants.
Before GREEN, P.J., MARQUARDT, J., and BRAZIL, S.J.
GREEN, J.: This is a summary judgment case involving an allegedly fraudulent sale of a house. Christian and Janet Kunzle purchased a house from Derek and Catherine Brennan for approximately $1,000,000. The central issue in this case involves a failure by the Brennans to disclose a professional inspection report to the Kunzles. This report revealed potential latent defects in the house. The Kunzles argue that the failure to disclose this report constituted fraud by silence. Nevertheless, the Brennans contend that the Kunzles would have discovered the hidden defects if they had inspected for water leaks before the sale. Although acknowledging that the Kunzles had conducted a number of inspections of the house, the trial court implicitly determined that had the Kunzles hired professional inspectors specifically for water leak issues, they would have learned of the defects. Consequently, the trial court granted summary judgment for the Brennans.
The Kunzles, however, had presented expert evidence that the defects were not discoverable through a reasonable inspection. As a result, the Kunzles maintain that the trial court inappropriately granted summary judgment because a genuine issue of material fact remained at issue. We agree, holding that the reasonableness of the Kunzles' inspections was a question of fact. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for trial on the Kunzles' fraud by silence counterclaim.
The Kunzles also appeal from the trial court's grant of summary judgment on their counterclaims of fraudulent and negligent misrepresentations, negligence, and breach of implied warranties in favor of the Brennans. We find no error in the grant of summary judgment on those counterclaims. Based on language in the buyers' acknowledgment of the sellers' disclosure statement, the Kunzles' failure to specifically indicate the representations on which they were relying barred them from maintaining a cause of action for affirmative or negligent misrepresentations. Moreover, the Kunzles have abandoned their arguments on their counterclaims of negligence and breach of implied warranties. We therefore affirm the trial court's summary judgment for the Brennans on the following counterclaims: affirmative and negligent misrepresentations, negligence, and breach of implied warranties.
Further, the Kunzles appeal from the trial court's judgment foreclosing their mortgage held by the Brennans. The Kunzles maintain that their mortgage should not have been foreclosed until their counterclaims of fraud and misrepresentation had been resolved. Because the Kunzles provide no relevant authority for their argument, they have essentially abandoned this issue. Moreover, we find no error and affirm the trial court's entry of judgment on the Brennans' mortgage foreclosure action because the Kunzles' counterclaims did not provide a defense to and would not have affected the mortgage foreclosure.
Finally, the Brennans cross-appeal the trial court's award of attorney fees and the calculation of interest under the promissory note. The Brennans argue that the trial court erred in ruling that the parties did not agree to reimbursement for attorney fees incurred in defending the Kunzles' counterclaims. Nevertheless, we determine that the promissory note and mortgage allow the Brennans to recover attorney fees incurred in enforcing the promissory note and in foreclosing the mortgage but does not allow for attorney fees in defending the counterclaims asserted by the Kunzles. In addition, the Brennans contend that the trial court erred in determining that the interest rate on default should fluctuate monthly based on the statutory rate published by the Secretary of State under K.S.A. 2006 Supp. 16-207. We agree. We interpret the promissory note as requiring the interest rate on maturity to be the statutory rate published by the Secretary of State on that maturity date and that such rate shall continue until the unpaid principal balance is paid in full. Therefore, we reverse the award of interest and remand the case for the trial court to recalculate interest at the fixed rate of 7.93%. Accordingly, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for trial; and reverse in part and remand with directions.
Facts
The Kunzles entered into a real estate sales contract to purchase a house from the Brennans for approximately $1,000,000. The Kunzles partially financed the house by taking out a mortgage for $435,000 with the Brennans and signing a promissory note. The real estate contract contained a provision allowing the Kunzles to conduct property inspections. Moreover, the contract stated that if the buyers failed to conduct inspections, the buyers "shall have waived any right to cancel or renegotiate this Contract pursuant to the inspection provisions."
As part of the contract, the Kunzles also signed a sellers' disclosure statement that had been filled out by the Brennans. In the "ROOF" category of the disclosure statement, the Brennans checked the box "Yes" as to whether any insurance claims had been made in the past 5 years; they also checked "Yes" as to whether repairs were made from the claims. The contract required the Brennans to list the name of the company that did the repairs. The Brennans wrote "Reeds' Restoration" in the space provided. The contract also required the Brennans to explain in detail any answers that were marked "Yes." The Brennans wrote in the space furnished: "3 windows leaked–solution caulking. Chimney flashing repaired to eliminate 4th window leak."
Christian Kunzle testified that before signing the disclosure statement, he asked Derek Brennan about the written disclosures. Regarding the insurance claim, Christian testified that Derek told him there had been some wind damage and that some ridges had broken off of the roof but that he had it repaired. When Christian asked about the four window leaks, Derek explained the caulking and grouting process that had been done to repair the leaks. Christian testified that after going over the disclosure statement with Derek, he asked Derek if there was anything else to add in terms of repairs, modifications, or other issues that would affect a buyer of his home, but Derek replied, "'No.'"
Before closing on the house, the Kunzles hired Larry L. Vaught Roofing to inspect the roof of the house. In his roof inspection report, Vaught noted that he had examined two leaks in the house, one above the kitchen and one in the master bedroom. Vaught stated that both of the leaks were likely attributable to roof flashing detail and submitted a proposal of recommended roof repairs. Vaught's opinion was that the roof was predominantly installed per accepted standards and would continue to provide several years of service. The Kunzles also hired Bruce Bird, a structural engineer, to perform a structural inspection of the house. During his inspection, Bird found no evidence of a structural problem but did advise that the patio be regraded so that water would drain away from the house.
In addition, the Kunzles had inspections performed on the heating and cooling system, the chimney, and the septic system. The property was also inspected for termites and tested for radon. Moreover, Christian Kunzle made several personal inspections of the house, taking notes of the things that he wanted fixed. The Kunzles also had their friend, Jim Lambie, a developer of single family residences, walk through the house to look for potential problems.
While walking through the house with Lambie, Christian discovered water and mold on the carpet in a study and water on the floor of the media wiring closet in the basement. In his deposition, Derek Brennan indicated that he discovered these leaks when he returned to the house in June 2001. In a document titled "Statement of Condition–Update 8/2/01," the Brennans disclosed the leak in the study and the leak in the wiring closet and another leak that they had discovered at the top of a laundry room window. The Brennans set forth the corrective actions that they had taken to repair the leaks, which included professional caulking, mending of the carpet, and installation of step flashing.
On July 11, 2001, the Kunzles delivered an "Inspection Notice" to the Brennans and initialed the option of "Offer to Renegotiate," indicating that they had found unacceptable conditions from the written opinions of professionals who had inspected the property. They attached an "Addendum A" setting forth a list of the unacceptable conditions.
During a meeting discussing a list of the proposed repairs to the residence, Christian specifically asked Derek if there was anything else they needed to know about the house. According to Christian, Derek stated that the disclosure statement was complete and that he did not want to add anything else.
On July 25, 2001, the parties signed an amendment to the contract. Attached to the amendment was "Addendum A," a list of 41 unacceptable conditions. Under the amendment, the Brennans agreed to pay the Kunzles $1,475 for 7 of the items listed in Addendum A. The Brennans agreed to correct the remaining items in Addendum A.
The Kunzles closed on the house on August 3, 2001. The Kunzles took out a $435,000 mortgage with the Brennans and signed a promissory note. Several days after the Kunzles moved into the house, they discovered water infiltration in an interior wall in the house. The problem was discovered when a painter attempted to sand out some blisters on the baseboards and discovered that the baseboard's veneer was mushy and wet.
After this discovery, the Kunzles undertook a process of destructive testing to identify areas where water was infiltrating through the exterior of the house. In addition, the Kunzles had tests performed to determine where water was infiltrating through the walls. During these tests, the Kunzles found evidence of water infiltration around many of the windows and also discovered damage to the home's sheathing. In addition, the Kunzles discovered that many of the control joints of the masonry stucco were sources of water infiltration. Moreover, the area where the deck joined the house was a source of significant water infiltration and damages. The Kunzles spent more than $500,000 to remediate the water infiltration problems.
In September 2001, the Brennans, for the first time, disclosed to the Kunzles a report that had been completed in 1999 by Laurence Fehner, a professional engineer with Norton & Schmidt Engineers LLP. Fehner's report detailed an inspection he had performed in October 1999, concerning four water leak areas in the house. In describing his examination of the first water leak area, Fehner noted that the leak problems were significant enough that a hole was cut in the ceiling to observe the underside of the roofing. Based on his observations, Fehner indicated that the metal roofing products were not the cause of the leak problem. In examining the exterior of the home, Fehner observed no signs of vapor barrier or felt paper behind the stucco finishes at the bottom edge:
"A review outside the home of the area in question revealed several areas where there are significant leak potentials. The exterior cladding is a synthetic stucco system. . . . I observed no signs of vapor barrier or felt paper behind the stucco finishes at the bottom edge."
Fehner then noted several problems with the wall system in and around the leakage areas above the sitting room, including inadequate flashings and joint conditions:
"A review of the wall system in and around the leakage areas above the sitting room revealed that there are no kickout flashings where gutters abut the wall. . . . This is contrary to most typical details provided by EMMA and synthetic stucco suppliers who typically require kickout flashings at these points. . . . The joints between the synthetic stucco finishes and the windows are not jointed or sealed. The synthetic stucco finishes were simply butted to the window frame. Water which penetrates at these various points simply proceeds downward through the wall cavity where it intersects various floor and header framing and then leaks in. Further, the flashings above the half round window terminate and are not kicked out. This condition results in water sheeting down the face of the wall being able to penetrate down through the joints along the sides of the window."
After making several observations about the conditions in the room above the sitting room, Fehner indicated that the leak problems were not related to the main roof of the house. Fehner then stated that additional destructive testing would have to be completed in order to pinpoint the exact location of the leak:
"Additional testing can be performed, however, [that] may result in additional damages to the home or involve some destructive testing. To exactly pinpoint the leak location will require holes being made in the exterior siding of the home so that moisture probes can be inserted. Additionally, interior finishes will need to be cut open to expose various other areas. Water testing of both various wall details and the windows can also be performed. There are no open or obvious signs that the window system itself is leaking, however, the water test can verify if it is contributing to the leak problems."
In discussing a second leak in the first floor sitting room, Fehner stated:
"Water stains were observed on the sheetrock finishes below the sill at each corner of the window. Again, a review was made outside and I found that the synthetic stucco finishes were simply butted to the jambs of the window. . . . Mr. Brennan explained that the leak problems only occurred when there were significant winds and they did not generally develop when the rain was straight down. This condition, again, indicates that the leak problems are related to problems with the walls and not the main roof of the house."
Fehner opined that this second leak area occurred from water "leaking in along the butted joints of the wall finishes to the jambs of the window systems both on the first and second floor."
Fehner concluded his report with his opinion that the leak problems experienced in the house were "related to various flash, joints and trim detail." Fehner stated that the leak problems could be corrected "by properly correcting all of the various flashing, joint and trim conditions noted." Nevertheless, Fehner stated that no attempt had been made to review components that were not readily viewable; that no destructive testing or moisture testing had been performed; and that nondestructive moisture testing could not be performed due to the mesh used in the synthetic stucco finishes.
The Brennans received the Norton & Schmidt report in late 1999. Fehner had been sent to the house after the Brennans had discovered water leaks around some windows in the house and had called Rick Revelle with Revelle Homes, Inc. Revelle came out to the house to examine the leaks and eventually contacted his subcontractors to inspect the roof and the windows. Fehner was sent to the house by Revelle's insurance company.
Based upon the Norton & Schmidt report, Revelle prepared a remediation plan and cost estimate, which were submitted to Revelle's insurance company. In May 2000, the Brennans accepted $12,594 in full settlement of its claims against Revelle and its insurance company. Of this amount, only $4,560.32 was spent on the suggested repairs. The repairs were completed in November 2000. The Kunzles did not learn about the Revelle remediation plan until it was disclosed during the discovery process of this case.
In March 2002, the Brennans sued the Kunzles after the Kunzles defaulted on their mortgage and promissory note. In an amended petition filed in October 2002, the Brennans sought payment of the note and foreclosure as a first and prior lien on the property. The Kunzles answered the petition and counterclaimed against the Brennans. In their answer, the Kunzles maintained that the Brennans' claims were barred by fraud, misrepresentation, and negligence of the Brennans. The Kunzles contended that they had the right to rescind the contract to purchase the residence.
In their amended counterclaims, the Kunzles sought damages based on the theories of fraud and negligent misrepresentations by the Brennans (count I); negligence by the Brennans in the design and construction of the residence and in the repairs made to the residence (count II); and breach of implied warranties by the Brennans (count III). In regard to their fraud and negligent misrepresentation counterclaim, the Kunzles asserted that the Brennans had intentionally failed to disclose material facts relating to the condition of the residence. The Kunzles set forth a list of several things that the Brennans had failed to disclose, including the Norton & Schmidt report from October 1999.
In April 2004, the Brennans moved for summary judgment on the Kunzles' amended counterclaims. On the Kunzles' counterclaim relating to fraud and negligent misrepresentations, the Brennans argued that the Kunzles could not reasonably rely upon the truth or falsity of their representations because the contract gave the Kunzles the right to inspect and specifically stated that the Brennans' representations were not warranties.
In responding to the Brennans' motion for summary judgment, the Kunzles provided an affidavit from Vernon Reed, an architect who had been hired by the Kunzles to investigate the water infiltration problems after they moved into the house. Reed's opinion was that "the causes of the leaks in the Kunzle residence were the result of improper and defective construction techniques." Reed testified as follows:
"The nature and existence of the leaks in this house, and the extent of those leaks, would normally not be discoverable in the absence of some specific direction being given to the investigator to a particular problem, and then, absent destructive testing, the full extent of the problem would not be discoverable under normal circumstances."
In addition, Reed testified that the Brennans had not provided enough information to the Kunzles to justify retaining a professional inspector, such as a civil engineer or an architect, to conduct further investigation of the water leak problems before closing:
"I do not believe that enough information was given to the Kunzles by their sellers to justify the retention of a civil engineer, such as Larry Fehner, or an architect to undertake inspection of this house prior to closing. It would be unusual and unnecessary, in most circumstances, to have a civil engineer or architect inspect a residence prior to closing. "
Moreover, noting that the information provided in the Norton & Schmidt report would have warranted further investigation, Reed stated:
"I read the Norton & Schmidt report at sometime prior to June 8, 2002 and after the Kunzles purchased the residence. Had the Kunzles been furnished a copy of that report prior to closing, that most certainly would have suggested further inspection-investigation by the Kunzles of the exterior covering of the house."
Despite Reed's affidavit, the trial court granted summary judgment to the Brennans on all of the Kunzles' counterclaims. On the Kunzles' counterclaim of fraud and negligent misrepresentations, the trial court noted that the Kunzles had agreed that they would verify conditions in the house through their own inspections. Pointing out that the Kunzles had failed to hire a water leak inspector, the trial court stated:
"The Kunzles, knowing of some prior water leak problems in the house, failed to hire professional inspectors to look at the water related items. The Kunzles did hire professional inspectors, but only for roof and structural issues. Kunzles agreed to accept the house 'as is' following their opportunity to inspect and after their list of repair items in 'Addendum A' to the Amendment in the sale contract were resolved to their satisfaction. The Kunzles had agreed that the Brennans' disclosures were not a warranty and that the Kunzles would rely on the inspections they had been advised to obtain."
The trial court found, as a matter of law, that the Kunzles could not have reasonably relied on the Brennans' representations and, therefore, could not maintain an action for fraudulent or negligent misrepresentation against the Brennans.
The Kunzles moved for a reconsideration of the trial court's rulings on its counterclaims. Nevertheless, the trial court affirmed its previous rulings. On the Brennans' foreclosure action, the trial court ruled that the mortgage should be foreclosed as the Kunzles had admitted to signing the mortgage and note but had stopped making payments. Moreover, the trial court granted judgment against the Kunzles for $433,924.24, plus interest of $73,145.40 through August 2004.
Trial Court Judgment
Should summary judgment have been granted to the Brennans on the Kunzles' counterclaims?
On appeal, the Kunzles argue that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to the Brennans on the counterclaims. An appellate court's standard of review in summary judgment cases is set forth in Mitchell v. City of Wichita, 270 Kan. 56, 59, 12 P.3d 402 (2000):
"'Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, show that there is no genuine issues to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The trial court is required to resolve all facts and inferences which may reasonably be drawn from the evidence in favor of the party against whom the ruling is sought. When opposing a motion for summary judgment, an adverse party must come forward with evidence to establish a dispute as to a material fact . . . . to the conclusive issues in the case. On appeal, we apply the same rules and where we find reasonable minds could differ as to the conclusions drawn from the evidence, summary judgment must be denied. [Citation omitted.]'"
Moreover, a review of the trial court's grant of summary judgment in this case requires interpretation of the real estate sales contract and other documents pertaining to the sale of the residence. The interpretation and legal effect of written instruments are matters of law, and an appellate court exercises unlimited review. McGinley v. Bank of America, N.A., 279 Kan. 426, 431, 109 P.3d 1146 (2005). "Regardless of the construction given a written contract by the trial court, an appellate court may construe a written contract and determine its legal effect. [Citation omitted.]" Unrau v. Kidron Bethel Retirement Services, Inc., 271 Kan. 743, 763, 27 P.3d 1 (2001).
Here, the trial court granted summary judgment on the Kunzles' three counterclaims: fraud and negligent misrepresentation; negligence in the design and construction of the house and in the repairs done on the house; and breach of implied warranties. Although not clearly delineated in the Kunzles' answer and amended counterclaims, it is apparent that count I relating to fraud and negligent misrepresentations includes two causes of action: fraud by silence and negligent misrepresentations. Each of the above theories will be discussed separately.
Fraud by Silence
In reviewing whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on the Kunzles' fraud claim, this court reviews the facts in the light most favorable to the Kunzles. See Patterson v. Brouhard, 246 Kan. 700, 702, 792 P.2d 983 (1990). Moreover, the existence of fraud is normally a question of fact. Therefore, on appeal, this court's standard of review is limited to determining whether the trial court's findings of fact are supported by substantial competent evidence and whether the findings are sufficient to support the trial court's conclusions of law. Alires v. McGehee, 277 Kan. 398, 403, 85 P.3d 1191 (2004). Furthermore, "[a] court should be cautious in granting a motion for summary judgment when resolution of the dispositive issue necessitates a determination of the state of mind of one or both of the parties." Ruebke v. Globe Communications Corp., 241 Kan. 595, 605, 738 P.2d 1246 (1987). Even though fraud must be proved by clear and convincing evidence, a party resisting a motion for summary judgment in an action for fraud need not present clear and convincing evidence of fraud to oppose the motion. Dugan v. First Nat'l Bank in Wichita, 227 Kan. 201, 207, 606 P.2d 1009 (1980).
Actionable fraud may be based upon an affirmative misrepresentation made as to existing and material facts or upon a suppression of facts which the party is under a legal or equitable obligation to communicate. See Broberg v. Boling, 183 Kan. 627, 634-35, 331 P.2d 570 (1958) (affirmative misrepresentation); Wolf v. Brungardt, 215 Kan. 272, Syl. ¶ 4, 524 P.2d 726 (1974) (fraud by silence).
In setting forth count I of their counterclaims, the Kunzles alleged that the Brennans had failed to disclose several material facts, including the Norton & Schmidt report, before they closed on the house and took possession in August 2001. The Kunzles' fraud claim is based on the Brennans' alleged fraudulent nondisclosure, or fraud by silence, of certai